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ABSTRACT 
 
Historically, coffee has been an important cash crop in the developing world and a major source 
of employment, foreign exchange  and revenue. However, coffee producers have not always 
received a very large share of the export price of green coffee. Reasons that are often mentioned 
are heavy government intervention and high marketing and processing costs. Prior to reforms, 
government regulation of the domestic coffee markets in the form of fixed producer prices and 
the monopoly power of the Marketing Boards in Africa put a substantial wedge between the 
producer price and the world price of coffee by imposing an implicit tax on producers. From the 
early 1990s onwards, various Structural Adjustment Programmes were introduced in coffee 
exporting  countries. This had direct consequences for the various forms of marketing boards 
which were prevalent in the coffee and other commodity sectors. In most cases, they were either 
dissolved or had their powers curtailed. One of the key objectives driving the reforms was to 
ensure that the farmer received a higher proportion of crop proceeds.  Liberalisation was 
envisaged to have a positive effect on producer prices and price transmission signals from world 
markets to producers. This paper, an Error-Correction Model (ECM), analyses the impact of 
policy reform in Colombia, Ghana and Ivory Coast. A key question is whether producers of 
coffee beans received a higher share of  the international price  after reforms, as was the desired 
policy outcome. As findings indicate, the reforms induced stronger relationships among domestic 
and international prices in Colombia, but not in Ghana or the Ivory Coast. The institutional 
arrangements  coordinating the domestic  coffee  system and contract enforcement  may help 
explain the differences and should be explored further. 
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Chapter 1 
 
I. Background-The Coffee Market and its importance to the developing economies 
   
 
Brazil and Colombia have been the top world coffee producers for most of the twentieth century 
(Karp  1993). This situation has changed recently  with the extremely fast growth of coffee 
production in Vietnam. In 1999/2000, Colombia was replaced by Vietnam as the world’s second 
largest producer. In 2010, Vietnam produced 17.5 million 60 kg bags of coffee (USDA2010a) 
nearly double that of Colombia at 8.8 million 60 kg bags (USDA 2010b). Yet within Colombia 
coffee is still an important cash crop.  Despite relatively smaller individual contributions, 
collectively the African continent is an important player. Coffee producers in Africa, for their 
part, accounted for about 12% of global supply and approximately  11% of global exports of the 
product for the 2009/10 production  season.    Africa’s exports in recent times have been 
comparable to those of Indonesia’s (Commodity Market Brief  2010),  which is the fourth largest 
world producer of the commodity.  
 
Coffee, both in terms of growing as well as processing, is one of the most important industries in 
Colombia. As of 2010, coffee accounted for 0.75% of Colombian GDP and 5.22% of Colombian 
exports (ICO  2010).  Today the coffee industry is extremely important to the Colombian 
economy, providing employment to about 800,000 people, representing nearly a third of total 
rural employment  (Ramirez- 2003). For more than one century coffee generated the majority of 
the country’s foreign income.  Today its greatest economic and social importance lies in its 
capacity to generate employment, redistribute income, and promote regional development, 
supporting the social stability of the coffee zones.      
2 
Almost 90% of the coffee producers are very small farmers, with less than 3 hectares planted to 
coffee. In 1997, the average amount of land planted to coffee by each of Colombia’s 423,368 
household coffee farms was 1.5 hectares (FNC, 1997).  Currently, around 560,000 families are 
small and medium farmers who depend directly on coffee production. Most are located in the 
central region of Colombia. An estimated three million people depend, in one way or another, on 
the different stages of the coffee industry in this country. Additionally, the country's coffee 
regions have achieved a faster, more consolidated level of development primarily because of the 
long tradition of cultivating coffee with a competitive advantage and also by the important role 
that the institutional arrangement of the coffee growers has played in the past (Ramirez- 2003). 
Colombian coffee farmers organised themselves into the Colombian Coffee Growers’ Federation 
in 1927 at the Second National Coffee Congress with the objective to protect and defend coffee 
for the welfare of their country and to promote the economic and social well-being of growers 
(Junguito  and Pizano 1997).This institutional set up for the growers has been key to their 
success. Establishing the Federation not only kept private exporters from colluding to drive down 
prices paid to farmers, but over the years, the Federation established a number of subsidiary 
institutions, including a research institute, a capital fund and a merchant marine fleet (Bentley 
2000). The Federation also set up experimental farms and began the publication of a magazine, 
in which coffee growers could learn about the results of the experiments (FNC 1928). A further 
reason for success is the Federation’s  long-standing  political independence. The Colombian 
President no longer has to approve the committee’s measures (Junguito and Pizano 1997). The 
Federation is able to keep most of its earnings and manage its own business and farmers play a 
key role in setting the research agenda.  
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Coffee previously was the most important export crop produced in Africa. During 1984–6, it 
represented a staggering 24 per cent of the total value of African agricultural exports (Raikes 
2000). Africa’s share of the world coffee market has been slowly, yet continuously shrinking, 
from 17%  in 1995 to 13.6% in 2007, to  closer to 11% in 2011. Yet, a number of African 
countries – even those with a low share of the global export market – still rely on coffee for a 
high proportion of their export earnings. While Africa’s contribution to global coffee production 
in 2011  was only 11%, coffee is still an important export commodity and source of livelihoods 
for large proportion of the population in some countries. For example, Ethiopia and Rwanda 
respectively derived 26% and 22% of their export revenues from coffee in 2009. Furthermore, in 
Africa, coffee exports during 2010–11 represented more than 5 per cent in nine countries (ICO 
2010). In 2010, Ethiopia was one of the world’s largest coffee producers, ranking as the 5
th 
largest coffee producer after Brazil, Vietnam, Indonesia and Colombia1 (ICO).  In the Ivory 
Coast, the value of coffee constitutes 0.74 % of GDP and 2.9 % of all commodities exported. In 
Ghana the value of coffee constitutes 0.01 % of GDP and 0.03 % of all commodities exported. 
Africa has both large plantations, and small-scale family plots, although the small-scale 
producers dominate, in West Africa there are many areas where coffee is the single crop of 
small-scale farmers (Promar Consulting 2011). Thus, though individual contributions are small,  
the coffee supply chain benefits many more people in producing countries. 
 
II.The rational for studying the Coffee sector 
Examination of the coffee-marketing chain is particularly important for several reasons. First, 
over 90 per cent of global coffee production takes place in tropical and developing nations ,  
4 
while consumption takes place mainly in the industrialised world
1. Second, and importantly, for 
most of the period after the Second World War, coffee has been the second most valuable traded 
commodity after oil
2. Third, coffee was one of the ﬁrst ‘regulated’ commodities; with attempts 
dating back to the beginning of the twentieth century. Fourth, for a number of African countries, 
even those with a low share of the global export market, coffee constitutes a high proportion of 
their export earnings. Fifth, coffee has been treated as a ‘strategic’ commodity by governments 
of coffee producing countries; case in point the Ivory Coast’s current political stalemate. The 
winner of the November 2010 presidential election in the Ivory Coast, Alassane Ouattara, 
attempted to get Gbagbo (ex-president) to cede power and this led to civil war and a 
humanitarian crisis  (CNN2011). The Ivory Coast derives a significant amount of foreign 
exchange from export of coffee and cocoa and the industry is a crucial revenue source for the 
military and civil service. Ouattara called for a ban on coffee and  cocoa exports in January of 
2011 in an effort to reduce the funding going to Gbagbo and pressure him to give up power 
(Espresso and Coffee Guide 2011).  
 
Clearly, coffee is an important cash crop in the developing world and a major source of 
employment and revenue. The debate over the policies that surround its production, trade and 
finance are not only important, but in personal view, also necessary to the establishment and 
nurturing of a system that treats all market participants fairly, and none at the expense of others. 
The analysis of the coffee-marketing chain provides key insights for understanding the impacts 
                                                 
1 The major exception is Brazil, which is the top producer and also one of the main consuming countries in the 
world. In Africa, the only country with substantial coffee consumption is Ethiopia. 
2 This has changed recently. In 1996/7, coffee ranked only ﬁfth among internationally traded commodities after oil, 
aluminum, wheat and coal. 
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of the liberalization of domestic commodity markets in developing economies in relation to a 
changing global environment.  
 
III. The Organization of the Global Coffee Industry 
 
The global coffee trade offers a basis for a diverse array of research questions. For example ,the 
industry can be broken down by varieties which are eventually processed differently and cater to 
different markets. It can also be considered in terms of trade, either before or after processing or 
in terms of how the International Coffee Organization (ICO) categorizes coffee types. Another 
interesting research question. The one addressed here, is to determine the characteristics of the 
industry pre and post-structural adjustments.  
 
The industry is organized around two primary  coffee  varieties  (Coffea  Arabica  and Coffea 
canephora – also known as ‘Arabica’ and ‘Robusta’, respectively) and two primary processing 
methods (‘wet’ and ‘dry’). With the ‘wet’ method, the end result is ‘Mild’ (or washed) coffee, 
normally of the Arabica type. With the ‘dry’ method, the end result is ‘Hard’ coffee, either Hard 
Arabica or Robusta. The distinction is important as Mild Arabica, Hard Arabica and Robusta 
coffees are differentiated products that are priced differently, and are therefore traded separately. 
In all three cases, the product ready for export is called ‘green’ coffee which is packed in 60 kg 
bags (Brown 1991). Some Robusta coffee is also processed with the wet method, but its volume 
in international trade is insigniﬁcant. 
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The ICO
3  categorizes exports by type of coffee. Mild Arabica coffees are divided into 
‘Colombian Milds’ and ‘Other Milds’. Colombian Milds comprise coffees produced in 
Colombia, Kenya and Tanzania. The main players in the Other Milds category are Guatemala, 
Mexico and India. ‘Brazilian Naturals’ basically consist of Hard Arabicas from Brazil and 
Ethiopia. Another ICO category comprises Robusta coffees from all origins. Here, Vietnam is by 
far the main producer, but Côte d’Ivoire, Indonesia and Uganda are also major players (ICO 
2011, Ponte 2001). The bulk of coffee produced in Ghana is Robusta because low elevation and 
high temperatures do not allow extensive agriculture of Arabica coffee (Kwapong 1997). 
 
The other two forms of coffee trade are instant and roasted coffee. Trade between producing and 
consuming countries consists mostly of green coffee and bulk instant coffee. Bulk instant coffee 
imported from producing countries is usually blended and re-packaged in consuming countries. 
The roasted coffee trade takes place almost exclusively between consuming countries. This 
pattern of trade comes from the fact that green and instant coffees can be stored for longer 
periods of time, while roasted coffee loses its freshness much more quickly (Talbot 1997). 
 
An important question that one may research is the change in price transmission that may have 
occurred after the implementation of reforms. Thus the international coffee industry may be 
studied by breaking it up into the ‘pre structural adjustment’ and ‘post structural adjustment’ 
periods. Structural Adjustment Facilities (SAF) began its operations in 1986. As a condition of 
                                                 
3 The ICO Is the International Coffee Organization (ICO) is the main intergovernmental organization for coffee, 
bringing together exporting and importing Governments to tackle the challenges facing the world coffee sector 
through international cooperation. Its Member Governments represent 97% of world coffee production and over 
80% of world consumption. The ICO was set up in London in 1963 under the auspices of the United Nations 
because of the great economic importance of coffee. It administers the International Coffee Agreement (ICA), an 
important instrument for development cooperation. The latest Agreement, the ICA 2007, entered into force on 2 
February 2011.  
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receiving these loans, countries had to agree to adopt IMF structural adjustment programs. 
Structural adjustment programs (SAPs) generally required countries to adopt policies such as a 
reduction in government spending, monetary tightening (high interest rates and/or reduced access 
to credit), elimination of government subsidies for food and other items of popular consumption, 
privatization of enterprises previously owned or operated by the government, and reductions in 
barriers to trade, as well as to foreign investment and ownership (Naiman 1999). The dates for 
implementation of SAPs were different for different countries and thus the period before SAPs 
(pre structural adjustments) and after SAPs (after structural adjustments) differ accordingly.  
 
IV. Pre-Structural Adjustment 
The pre structural adjustment period, as mentioned above is that which existed before the 
implementation of SAPs in the various countries. Categorized by heavy government intervention 
in agricultural and financial markets, pre structural adjustments led to heavy spending on and 
protection of the agricultural sectors.  
 
Historically, four major parties have played critical roles in the coffee production chain; the 
farmers, global traders, roasters and the bodies that tied them together were the marketing 
boards. The global traders, sourced coffee from a variety of origins, and sold them on to the 
fourth major party in the chain. The roasters, who branded and sold the coffee on to retailers. 
While Farmers, traders and roasters remained after structural adjustments, the farmers and 
marketing boards were a key focus in the SAPs.  
 
The farmers have been central to the marketing chain, and until recent years when Brazilian 
farmers have gone in for large-scale irrigated farming (Mathey et. al-  2004), most of these  
8 
growers have been operating on a small or medium-scale. The vast majority of coffee farms in 
Brazil are less than ten hectares in size. According to the Diagnosis of the Coffee Production in 
Minas Gerais, 71% of farms are less than 10 hectares, 25% of farms had less than 50 hectares, 
and only 4% of farms were larger than 50 hectares (Coffeeresearch 2011). The majority of coffee 
farmers in Africa are small holders with farm sizes hardly exceeding 2 hactres (Kucel). Small-
sized farmers produce 76% of coffee in Colombia,  because small farm size provides 
heterogeneity of the landscape (Miura 2011).  
 
In most producing countries, the second party of  significance has been the marketing boards 
(particularly African countries) and producer associations (especially in South America) who 
have been responsible for various non-farm activities in the producing countries –  milling, 
buying, quality checking, marketing and exporting. They could take any of the following three 
forms:  
 
• Marketing Boards: Located in many ex-British economies. More often they worked closely 
with producer cooperatives. The cooperatives were responsible for buying and milling coffee, 
and the marketing boards set the prices, licensed producers, were responsible for quality control 
and upgrading, and exported the product. The marketing boards also coordinated the production 
systems, and were the intermediaries between producers and global traders. Marketing boards 
also often held or coordinated coffee auctions.   
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• Instituto: Some Latin American countries used a diluted form of Marketing Boards. Though 
they had many of the regulatory functions of marketing boards, including price formation and 
quality assurance, they played a less active role in buying.  
 
• Caisse de Stabilisation. This was a francophone equivalent to the Marketing Boards operating 
in many ex-British colonies. It replicated many of the functions of the Boards, but unlike the 
Boards, it seldom physically handled the coffee. In other words, it assumed the role of 
governance without becoming involved in direct production processes. 
 
V. Reason for Establishment of Marketing Boards 
 
During most of the 20th century, governments not only intervened in primary commodity 
markets, but in fact accepted such interventions as part of the development policy framework 
(Akiyama 2001). While the instruments of intervention varied across countries and commodities, 
a dominant architecture based on the marketing board (Deaton 1999; Kaplinsky 2004) emerged. 
Designed to stabilize producer incomes, they often served as a monopoly distribution network 
(Kreuger 1990), and administered domestic prices that were normally pan-seasonal, pan-
territorial, and detached from international prices (Gilbert 1999a / Gilbert 1999b).  
 
The dominant feature of almost all primary commodity markets during the 1980s was a fall in 
both real and nominal prices which was secular in nature (Tollens 1999). Experiences with 
famine and food shortages convinced many governments in Asia and in newly independent Sub-
Saharan Africa that control of the food crop sector was paramount to maintaining food security.  
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Controls were frequently extended to cash crops, which had a strategic value as a source of 
foreign currency and tax revenues (Akiyama 2003) 
   
Development theory and political considerations also encouraged continued intervention. Many 
developing countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East, influenced by the 
example and aid of the Soviet Union, believed strongly in state-dominated economic 
development which was further promoted by the prevalent structure of commodity exchange 
between the developing world and the Soviet Union (Fienberg and Avakov 1991). Moreover 
governments frequently pursued policies that taxed agriculture in order to promote industrial 
development (Timmer 2009), and establishing a marketing board was a common way to achieve 
that 
 
Practical and economic considerations often provided a further rationale for intervention  in 
commodity markets. Commodities were often useful revenue sources, and some policymakers 
saw taxing commodity exports as the most convenient and practical way to finance state 
activities (Bates 1981). Government-controlled systems also  provided a source  of political 
patronage— for example; politicians could reward supporters with trading licenses or high-level 
appointments to marketing boards. Further, state management often provided politicians and 
government officials with funding for discretionary expenditures. Government control of key 
commodity markets created opportunities for corruption. Indirect taxes on export commodities 
provided financial benefits to the urban elite (Bates 1981) who were important political allies. To 
make planting decisions easier, prices were frequently fixed for the crop year. To smooth annual 
price fluctuations, domestic prices were uncoupled from international prices. And to resolve  
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regional disparities, fixed prices were pan-territorial so that all producers received the same 
purchase price.  However, as time passed, economic conditions changed and hence a change of 
perspective was ushered in. After decades of preserving and promoting institutional control over 
the coffee markets, governments began designing policies to reform the  marketing boards and  
to let market forces drive coffee export supply chains. 
  
 
VI. Post Structural Adjustment 
 
 
Economist at one time embraced a policy encouraging interventions by marketing boards. 
However, changes in the international dynamics of the coffee market soon generated a set of new 
problems. Governments’ fiscal problems and parastatals’ financial difficulties combined to 
prompt market reforms in many coffee- and cocoa producing countries(Akiyama 2001).  
 
The single most important factor behind the liberalization of the coffee subsector may have been 
the collapse of the ICO’s export quota system in July of 1989 which was exacerbated by Brazil’s 
lack of interest in preserving the export quota system and the United States’ withdrawal from the 
International Coffee Agreement. The first International Coffee Agreement (ICA) was signed 
1962 and included most producing and consuming countries as signatories. Under the ICA 
regime, a target price (or a price band) for coffee was set, and export quotas were allocated to 
each producer country. When the indicator price calculated by the International Coffee 
Organization (ICO) rose over the set price, quotas were relaxed; when it fell below the set price, 
quotas were tightened. If an extremely large rise in coffee prices took place (as in 1975-77), 
quotas were abandoned until prices fell back within the band. Although there were problems  
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with this system, most analysts agree that it was successful in raising and stabilizing coffee 
prices (Akiyama and Varangis 1990; Bates 1997; Daviron 1996; Gilbert 1996; Palm and 
Vogelvang 1991). The inherent stabilizing force of the ICA, coupled with regulated markets in 
producing countries, created a relatively stable institutional environment where rules were 
relatively clear, change politically negotiated, and proportions of generated value added fairly 
distributed between consuming and producing countries. The relatively homogeneous form of 
trade limited the possibilities of product upgrading, but producing countries ensured product 
valorization through higher prices generated by the ICA (Ponte 2001b). However, the ICA 
system was eventually undermined by free-riding and squabbling over quotas. Other problems 
were the increasing volume of coffee traded with (or through) non-member importing countries 
at lower prices, the growing fragmentation of the market, and the increasing heterogeneity of 
development models (as Brazil and Indonesia moved towards a more export-oriented industrial 
strategy) (Daviron 1993, Daviron 1996). The collapse of the International Coffee Agreement 
(ICA) significantly impacted the marketing and pricing systems coffee-producing countries and 
eliminated the need for government marketing agencies. The collapse of the marketing boards in 
most producing countries increased exports as it was believed that high sales levels would ensure 
higher quotas on the re-establishment of the ICA. This led to a decline in international prices 
while the need for additional funds to maintain prices paid to domestic producers at pre-reform 
levels grew. At the same time coffee-generated tax revenues to governments fell, making the 
situation non-sustainable. This led to shortfalls at the marketing boards which were finding it 
difficult to carry out their core function of  maintaining fixed producer prices. The allocation of 
export quotas had became a source of rents for rentiers within the system and was used to sustain 
marketing agency activities within the government (Bohman et. al.1996).  The political economy  
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of domestic interventions also changed in lieu of the collapse of the international agreements 
which made resistance to liberalization more difficult.  
 
Other reasons that thrust economies towards market reforms were changes in the views of 
development economists, and push for market reforms from agencies such as the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). As development economists' preference for market-
based policy instruments grew, a number of political and economic events reinforced the notion 
that market interventions stifled growth and economic opportunity and created an opportunity for 
reform. These include the successful adoption of more market-oriented domestic agricultural 
policies in China, the failure of several commodity agreements, and the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. Additional factors also encouraged change, including accumulated debt burdens in Latin 
America and Africa and increased activism by the international financial institutions to bring 
about policy changes (Akiyama 2003). These ideological and political changes were a factor in 
the emergence a market based approach in economies around the world, especially those that 
were looking towards such agencies for financial assistance. From the early 1990s onwards, 
various Structural Adjustment Programmes were introduced in coffee producing countries, 
sometimes under the insistence of multilateral and bilateral aid agencies, and in other cases with 
the active participation of governments. This had direct consequences for the various forms of 
marketing boards which were prevalent in the coffee and other commodity sectors. In most 
cases, they were either dissolved or had their powers curtailed. One of the key objectives driving 
the reforms was to ensure that the farmer received a higher proportion of crop proceeds. The 
Common Fund for Commodities Report which involved a cooperation between the World Bank 
and the International Coffee Organisation concluded that “the key benefits of liberalisation is  
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that increased competition throughout the marketing chain leads to a reduction in marketing 
costs and growers receiving a higher proportion of the export unit value” (CFC 2000).  
 
 
VII.Reforms in Colombia, Ghana and the Ivory Coast 
 
Following the collapse of the economic clauses of the International Coffee Agreement most 
African countries moved to eliminate government export monopolies in coffee –  examples 
include Cameroon and Côte d’Ivoire, Madagascar, and Uganda. In other countries, for example 
Ethiopia, it was the change in political regime that prompted the reforms in the coffee subsector 
(Akiyama, 2001). In most of the coffee cases, domestic and export markets were fully liberalized 
and  structural adjustment lending played a role in several of the countries (Akiyama, 2003).  We 
briefly discuss the reforms in Colombia, Ghana and the Ivory Coast which is intended to serve as 
context to the reforms in the countries.  
 
Colombia 
 
Colombia is an outstanding example of a coffee sector run entirely by an association of 
producers. The powerful Federación Nacional de Cafeteros de Colombia (FNC) exerts major 
influence on how the sector functions in this category. The FNC is contracted by the government 
to implement coffee policy and its involvement in coffee marketing is substantial. The FNC sets 
minimum producer prices, controls purchasing, processing and exporting of coffee and provides 
extension services, support to research and funding of infrastructure projects. FNC’s agents 
handle approximately half of all coffee exports  (40% in 1989), with the remaining crop being 
sold to private traders. In addition, the FNC serves as a stabilization fund, buying surplus coffee  
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from producers at a guaranteed price, which may exceed the world price net of marketing costs. 
In particular, between 1989 and 1994 producers received artificially high administered prices, 
causing losses to the FNC. Unsustainable in the long run, the system was abolished in 1995. 
Although no radical structural changes were made that year, 1995 is taken as the year of the 
reforms  for this paper, because the artificially  high producer prices were suspended, which 
should have brought the internal prices closer to the world market prices. While the Colombian 
coffee sector is marked by high degree of semi-governmental intervention (Kronivos 2004), the 
system seems to benefit the growers. Acting unified, Colombian growers  have  historically 
managed to get a substantial price premium on the world market and can influence the domestic 
policy to their benefit. Unlike in many other coffee producing countries, the system serves the 
interests of producers, not government bureaucrats or influential exporters in the private sector 
(Bentley 2000, Kronivos 2004) . 
 
 
Ghana 
 
As a typical pre-reform state marketing board, the Ghana Cocoa Board  (COCOBOD) was a 
fully controlling the internal marketing, exporting, grower prices and marketing margins. The 
Produce Buying Company (PBC), a subsidiary of the COCOBOD, bought coffee from producers 
and stored it in its warehouses after processing, inspection and grading. A different division of 
the COCOBOD, the Cocoa Marketing Company (CMC), handled external marketing. However, 
unsustainable levels of  government expenditure, an increasingly overvalued exchange rate, 
import licensing, inflation , price controls and heavy state involvement in the running of the 
economy (Tsikata 1999, Leith and Söderling 2000) led to a collapse. For example, in 1984 about 
2.5 percent of the population was employed in the Civil Service, one of the highest ratios in  
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Africa at the time. Preliminary audits conducted in 1986 indicated that there were tens of 
thousands of ‘ghost workers’ on the public sector payroll (Brooks 1997).  
 
In 1984 COCOBOD  underwent institutional reform aimed at subjecting the cocoa sector to 
market forces. COCOBOD's role was reduced, and 40 percent of its staff, or at least 35,000 
employees, were dismissed. Furthermore, the government shifted responsibility for crop 
transport to the private sector. Subsidies for production inputs (fertilizers, insecticides, 
fungicides, and equipment) were removed, and there was a measure of privatization of the 
processing sector through at least one joint venture (Alderman, Canagarajah and Younger 1993). 
Following the structural adjustment programs in 1992, the government liberalized all internal 
and external marketing of coffee. Private traders were allowed to enter the market, and fixed 
prices and trading margins were abolished. The main functions, thereon, of the COCOBOD 
became sector regulation and management of licenses. The new marketing chain consists of 
Commission Agents that buy coffee from farms and registered exporters (the Licensed Buying 
Companies). By 1994 forty six companies held export licenses (ICO 2011).  
 
 
 
Ivory Coast 
 
During the French colonial period before World War II, large plantations and accompanying 
agricultural experimental stations were created in support of cocoa, coffee, and oil palm 
production. By 1955  The  ‘Caisse  de  Stuhilisution  des  Cows’  was  established  in  and 
incorporated  (after  independence  in  1960)  as  a  parastatal  under  the  complete control  of  
the  central  government (Cardenas 2002). Parastatal bodies were a critical part of the transition 
from colonial to independent status. These organizations were funded in part or in full by the  
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government, and provided such services for specific commodities as extension, development and 
credit among others.  Many parastatal bodies contracted with research stations to conduct 
research, and  have been a significant source of income for funding of commodity research.  The  
Caisse  determined  payments  for  all the  stages  along  the  marketing  chain,  including  the  
producers’  remuneration. Producers’  prices  were  meant  to  ‘reflect  production  cost’  and  
provide  ‘equal remuneration  for  all  crops’  (Akiyama  1988).  Consequently,  the  ratio  of 
producers’  prices  for  both  coffee  and  cocoa  has  remained  constant  since  the 1976/77  
season,  in  spite  of  divergent  world  prices (Cardenas 2002). On  paper,  any  surplus  obtained  
by  the  Caisse  at  the  end  of  a  crop  year should have  been  allocated  to  the  Price  
Stabilization  Reserve,  expenditures  for  rural infrastructure,  and  agricultural  credit  schemes.  
As  is  documented  in  Ridler  (1988),  the Caisse, at one time, provided  between  one-half  and  
two-thirds  of  public  sector  investment in  Cote  d’Ivoire.  The  return  on  those  investments  
was  at  best  insufficient  (or nonexistent  at  worse)  to  support  a  stable  price  after  the  
collapse  in  the  world market  during  the  1980’s.  
 
Coffee (and cocoa ) still dominate the country’s agriculture, however the decline in growth rate 
of   production of these commodities over the 1985-1994 period was partly responsible for the 
economic and financial problems of the country. The annual growth rate of coffee production fell 
from 0.7 percent in 1985-1989 to -7.9 percent in 1990-1994 (ICO 2011). This reduction in coffee 
production and mediocre performances were explained primarily by the behavior of the world 
prices of coffee (and cocoa).  
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The IMF became involved in Cote d'Ivoire in November 1989 on a stand-by arrangement where 
the government and the IMF agreed on an outline of economic policy changes.  Following the 
initial stand-by arrangements, six World Bank Structural Adjustment Loans from 1989-1993 
followed.  Then, in 1994, Cote d'Ivoire entered into the IMF Enhanced Structural Adjustment 
Facility (ESAF), which is an IMF concessional lending facility for the least developed countries. 
Prior to the ESAF loan, the Cote d’Ivoire government had to first agree to a set of structural 
adjustment programs as dictated by the World Bank and IMF.  It was a program of accelerated 
privatization, reduction in government expenditures followed by currency devaluation, and led to 
dismantling of marketing boards.  
 
VIII. Concluding remarks on marketing boards, reforms and focus of  this paper 
 
Marketing boards, as discussed earlier, have been commonplace institutions in coffee producing 
countires. With few exceptions, countries exporting primary commodities had developed 
marketing and pricing systems for export crops that included a ‘Board’ (as in Anglophone East 
and West Africa) or a ‘Caisse (as in francophone West Africa) , both being endowed with 
monopsony power in the purchase of  coffee and the ‘Institutios’ (in South American countries) 
which had a more diluted role. On one extreme when the country has some market power in the 
determination of world prices, the board can be used to regulate exports and, hence, control the 
world price. In this case, the marketing board is best regarded as a way of imposing an optimal 
tax on exports that allows the country to achieve the first-best outcome (Cardenas  1994).  
Marketing boards may also have important functions in cases where countries act as price-takers 
in the world market. Historically, national governments and ex-colonial powers have justified the 
existence of this institution on the grounds of stabilization of producers’ incomes (Cardenas  
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1994). This argument hinges on the instability of world prices. If local producers do not have 
access to instruments for consumption smoothing (futures contracts for example), the first-best 
outcome, it is then a second-best solution to create an institution that is able to save (dis-save) 
during periods of high (low) world prices, allowing each individual producer to face a stable 
income. 
 
However, marketing boards have often become instruments of taxation in spite of the stated 
objective to adequately pay producers (CFC 2000). There may be an incentive for politicians and 
officials with different objectives than those of the farmers to use the marketing board for 
redistribution purposes. In this case producers may benefit from dismantling the institution even 
if it represents a stable income. This has been pervasive in African countries where British and 
French officials were replaced after independence by urban political elites which derived 
financial and political leverage from managing the institution.  At the other extreme, like in 
Colombia, which is the exception rather than the norm, the association of coffee growers,  where 
producers exercise direct control over the institution, producers’ prices are higher compared with 
the instances where producers do not run the institution and more stable compared to countries 
where the institution does not exist (Cardenas1994).  
 
Various Structural Adjustment Programmes introduced in coffee producing countries, under the 
insistence of multilateral and bilateral aid agencies, and in other cases with the active 
participation of governments. As a result of reforms initiated in the mid-1980s, there has been a 
sea change on how agricultural export commodities are marketed and financed in many 
countries. For commodity markets, market reform has meant the reduction in government  
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involvement in marketing, increasing participation of the private sector in these activities and 
reducing distortions in producer prices. Though the measures to achieve these goals have varied, 
they have often included elimination or privatization of government marketing agencies, the 
introduction of competition in marketing sectors, the elimination of managed or administered 
prices, a reduction in taxes and the privatization of government-owned assets. Events triggering 
commodity market reforms were not independent of broader political and economic changes in 
most countries and the consequences of reform are often linked as well. One of the key 
objectives driving the reforms was to ensure that the farmer received a higher proportion of crop 
proceeds. The CFC 2000 Report concluded that “the key benefits of liberalisation is that 
increased competition throughout the marketing chain leads to a reduction in marketing costs and 
growers receiving a higher proportion of the export unit value” (CFC 2000).  
 
This thesis investigates the impact of the structural adjustment programs on the share of 
international prices received by producers, providing a comparison prior to reforms and after 
reforms. The central idea of this study is to add to the existing literature on the transmission of 
prices in the coffee sector, given the background of a dynamic policy environment in Africa and 
South America. Using an Error Correction Model, I am able to examine not only how changes in 
international prices are transmitted to farmers in coffee exporting countries, but also how quickly 
these changes are passed on, which may help illustrating the efficiency of one model (marketing 
boards) juxtaposed with another (free market with the participation of more private entities). 
Chapter 1 outlines the background on the coffee sector globally as well as within the 3 focal 
countries. The chapter details the history and the environment prevalent during the times of 
government control and intervention through marketing boards and moves on to describe  
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possible reasons for liberalization. Chapter 2 discusses the empirical model and the data used. 
Chapter 3 discusses the steps and test involved in modeling non-stationary economic time series. 
Chapter 4 discusses the results and provides a brief conclusion to the thesis.  
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Chapter 2 
 
I.Literature  Review 
 
There has been considerable attention and time devoted by researchers to price transmission in 
supply chains for agricultural commodities traded internationally. Observed usually at 
downstream stage of supply chain, Price transmission may be closely associated to market 
structure and market power. An extensive literature has evolved over time and several methods 
have been employed in the past to determine the degree of price transmission in agricultural 
commodities.  
 
Hallam and Zanoli (1993) suggest the use of error-correction models to provide a more useful 
theoretical framework for studying agricultural supply response after detailed theoretical 
analyses of the prevailing frameworks. Studies by Theil (2000, 2002), Mackay et al. (1999) and 
Abdulai and Reider (1995) all lend support to the superiority of cointegration and error 
correction modelling. The superiority of the cointegration technique lies in its flexibility; the 
approach does not impose any restrictions on the short-run behaviour of prices and quantities, 
and it rather requires a co-movement of the variables in the long-run. In the standard ECM, the 
dependent variable responds identically to deviations from the long-run equilibrium regardless of 
the magnitude and, moreover, the adjustment occurs in every period (Balke and Fomby 1997). 
 
Shepherd (2004) examines the impact of the elimination of ICA’s on price transmission in the 
coffee market chain using a vector autoregression (VAR) model. The authors argue that 
elimination of the export quota system did not lead to improved price transmission due to the  
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market power exercised by large, well established coffee processors. Gemech and Struthers 
(2007),  on the other hand find evidence of significant increases in coffee price volatility after the 
elimination of ICA.  
 
Mundlak et.al (1992) estimate a direct relationship between domestic and world market prices 
using a simple logarithmic model, to represent the relationship between domestic and world 
market prices and exchange rates. The authors estimate price transmission elasticities for 58 
countries and find evidence of almost perfect price transmission. However, the results appear to 
be distorted due to the lower estimates of price transmissions for individual commodities (wheat, 
coffee and cocoa) as compared to a pool of commodities which is close to unity. This indicated a 
high level of distortion in these particular markets, including coffee. 
 
Similar results are reported by Baffes et.al  (2003) who also use the error-correction model 
specification to estimate the responsiveness of the domestic prices to fluctuations on the world 
market. The authors analyze price transmissions for 10 commodities on a country-by-country 
basis for a period from 1970s to 1990s. The results of their study indicate that changes in the 
world prices cause only small variations in domestic prices. The authors go a step further, 
assessing whether policy reforms improved price transmission. Their approach introduces 
structural breaks corresponding to the years of substantial market reforms and the results show 
that in most countries the reforms have very limited effect on price transmission.  
 
Krivonos (2004), using the standard ECM, studies price transmission of coffee prices in 14 
countries. The author reports that short-run transmission of price signals from the world market  
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to domestic producers has improved after the re-structuring of coffee marketing boards, such that 
domestic prices adjust faster today to international price variations than they did before the 
reforms. The paper also reported some evidence of asymmetries in the way positive and negative 
world price changes are transmitted to domestic markets.  
 
Lord (2001) develops a theory-consistent market model for storable commodities and illustrates 
its characterization for a set of major traded commodities. Cointegrated variables in the demand 
functions are represented by the error correction mechanism (ECM), and expected prices in the 
stock demand relationship are generated by a rational expectations process. The performance of 
the model is then tested against the time-series model used to formulate expected prices, and is 
shown to  have a  smaller mean square error (higher efficiency) than that of  the time-series 
model. 
 
Ocran and Biekpe (2007) estimate agricultural commodity supply response at three levels of 
aggregation namely, all commodities, food commodities and exports commodities. Their study 
uses cointegration and error correction modeling techniques and construct aggregate price and 
quantity indices using the Tornqvist formula. The authors find that producers were responsive to 
price incentives in the long-run for all three non-oil commodity aggregates but in the short-run 
only producers of export commodities were responsive to price incentives. The study thus 
highlights that producers respond to price signals as predicted but structural features of the 
agricultural commodity sector that result in high transaction cost may account for the absence of  
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price response in the short-run. The authors recommendations state that interventions in lowering 
transaction cost in agricultural commodity production have the potential of stimulating a faster 
and considerable response to price incentives. 
 
Akiyama and Varangis (1990) employ simulation method for global coffee model and 
demonstrate that the export quota system contributed to stabilize international coffee prices. 
Mehta and Chavas (2008) find mixed results  in their study of the impact of the ICA on the 
relationship between farm prices in exporting countries, international prices, and retail prices in 
importing countries. They find that, in the short-run, retail prices respond asymmetrically to 
changes  in international prices  in the post-ICA period. However, in contrast, they find no 
evidence of asymmetric transmission between wholesale and farm prices.  
 
 More recently, Gómez, Lee and Körner (2010) examine price transmission from international to 
retail coffee prices in France, Germany and the United States in the post-ICA period during the 
period 1990- 2006. The authors employ an error correction model and find no evidence of long-
run price transmission asymmetries. However they provide evidence of short-run asymmetries 
with substantial differences among countries. 
 
This paper studies the impact of the Structural Adjustment Programs in Colombia, Ghana and 
Ivory Coast on the price transmission between international and domestic prices received by 
producers. I employ the standard ECM to determine if producers of coffee beans received a 
higher share of the international price after reforms compared to the period prior to reforms. The  
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contribution of this paper is to study the two different forms of marketing boards; the ‘marketing 
board’ and the ‘instutio’ and provide analysis on the price transmission in both. 
 
II. Empirical Model 
 
Following Engle and Granger (1987), I  test for co-integration between domestic and 
international prices. The model proposed by Engle and Granger introduced the concept of an 
Error Correction (EC) specification which incorporate dynamic elements into the estimation of 
price transmission mechanisms. Thus including the EC term allows tracking  the adjustment of 
domestic prices to their long term equilibrium in the period following the change in the 
international price.  
 
Consider an autoregressive distributed lag model (ARDL) (1,1) with two non-stationary time 
series Pt
d,  Pt
i and single lags: Pt−1
d , Pt−1
i ,  
 
𝑃𝑡
𝑑 = 𝑎0 + 𝗼1𝑃𝑡−1
𝑑 + 𝗼2𝑃𝑡
𝑖 + 𝗼4𝑃𝑡−1
𝑖 + 𝜀𝑡      (1) 
 
 
Where 𝑃𝑡
𝑑  is the domestic price and 𝑃𝑡
𝑖 is the international / world price, 𝑃𝑡−1
𝑑  is the lag of the 
domestic price, and 𝑃𝑡−1
𝑖  is the lag of the international price.  By assuming that 𝑃𝑡
𝑑 and 𝑃𝑡
𝑖 are co-
integrated, re-rearranging equation (1), gives the general form for an EC model as follows (see 
appendix A for derivation): 
 
∆𝑃𝑡
𝑑 = 𝗼0 + 𝜃�𝑃𝑡−1
𝑑 − 𝗽𝑃𝑡−1
𝑖 � + 𝗿(𝑃𝑡
𝑖 − 𝑃𝑡−1
𝑖 ) + 𝜀𝑡    (2) 
 
Where 𝜃 = (𝗼2 − 1) , 𝗽 =
𝗼1+𝗼3
𝗼2−1  and 𝗿 = 𝗼1, and ∆𝑃𝑡
𝑑 is the change in the domestic prices. The 
variation of the domestic price 𝑃𝑡
𝑑 in terms of its response to fluctuations in the world price Pt
i is  
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described in equation (2). The first term in brackets on the right hand side represents the error 
correction term (ECT) which, as mentioned earlier, represents the deviation from the equilibrium 
relation in the previous period.  
 
An additional piece of information provided by equation is the adjustment of domestic price 
Pt
d  to its long-term equilibrium. δ captures the immediate responsiveness of the domestic prices 
to changes in the world price, and θ is the ‘error-correction’ term, which measures the speed of 
adjustment of 𝑃𝑡
𝑑  to its long-run equilibrium 𝗽𝑃𝑡
𝑖. Prices dynamics should ensure that  θ  be 
negative, since 𝜃 implies correction downward when 𝑃𝑡−1
𝑑  exceeds βPt-1
i  and upward when  βPt-1
i  
exceeds 𝑃𝑡−1
𝑑  (Krivonos 2004). 
 
Equations (1) and (2) assume an unidirectional relationship between 𝑃𝑡
𝑑 and 𝑃𝑡
𝑖. However, it is 
possible that the two variables are determined simultaneously. Thus to examine whether the co-
integrating equation influences both variables, a test for weak exogeneity is conducted. A 
simultaneous representation of equations yields: 
 
∆𝑃𝑡
𝑑 = 𝑎0 + 𝗼1𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝗼2∆𝑃𝑡−1
𝑑 + 𝗼3∆𝑃𝑡
𝑖 + 𝗼4∆𝑃𝑡−1
𝑖 + 𝗼5∆𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑡 + 𝗼6∆𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑡−1 +
𝜀𝑡                                                                                                                                                                      (3) 
 
 
∆𝑃𝑡
𝑖 = 𝑎0 + 𝗼1𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝗼2∆𝑃𝑡−1
𝑖 + 𝗼3∆𝑃𝑡
𝑑 + 𝗼4∆𝑃𝑡−1
𝑑 + 𝗼5∆𝑅𝐴𝐼𝑁𝑡 + 𝗼6∆𝑅𝐴𝐼𝑁𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡   (4) 
 
   
Statistical inference requires identification of the short run dynamics, captured by dummy 
variables and variables for weather. For the international price equation, I employ the rain in 
Fortaleza, Brazil. The change in the monthly average of precipitation (∆𝑅𝐴𝐼𝑁𝑡) and the lagged 
change in the monthly average of precipitation (∆𝑅𝐴𝐼𝑁𝑡−1) in Fortaleza, Brazil is used to  
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identify the short run dynamics of the international price equation because weather patterns 
affect international prices (National Centre for Atmospheric Research 2010) and Brazil is a large 
exporter. The identifying restriction on the domestic price equation is the change in the monthly 
average precipitation (∆𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑡) and the lag of the change in the monthly average precipitation 
(∆𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑡−1) because weather patterns can affect domestic prices as well. Satellite-derived 
Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI) is normally used as a proxy for precipitation to 
detect and control for variation in local agricultural (Brown et al. 2009) (For source and 
explanation of variable please see section on Data). 
 
In order to capture the impact of the reforms on the parameters in the marketing chain, a set of 
dummies is used. The set of policy dummies reflect market liberalization: 
 
𝐷𝑡 = �
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑜 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑠
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑎 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑠          
 
The period of reform is different for each country and determines the choice of when ‘0’ is 
employed and when the series switches to ‘1’. In Colombia the year of reform is taken as 1995, 
when the artificially high producer prices were suspended, which should have, theoretically, 
brought the internal prices closer to the world market prices. In Ghana that year taken  is 1992 
since that is the year the COCOBOD was reformed and the government liberalized all internal 
and external marketing of coffee. Private traders were allowed to enter the market, and fixed 
prices and trading margins were abolished. The year of reform in Cote d'Ivoire is taken as 1994, 
when it entered into the IMF Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF). A precondition to 
entering ESAF was that the Cote d’Ivoire government had to first agree to a set of structural 
adjustment programs as dictated by the World Bank and IMF.   
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To ensure validity of the use of the error-correction model, one first needs to make sure that the 
time series used in the estimation are stationary or otherwise one risks estimating a relationship 
that is spurious. Such a mistake may lead us to conclude falsely that a relationship exists between 
the domestic and the International market prices. The stationarity properties of the price time 
series’ (both domestic and international) are tested using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
procedure (ADF) on both levels and first differences. In each case the hypothesis tested is that 
the time series follow a non-stationary process with a unit root. Rejecting the null hypothesis 
allows treating the time series as stationary. For an ECM representation to exist, 𝑃𝑡
𝑑and 𝑃𝑡
𝑖must 
also be cointegrated. Once having established a co-integrating relationship between domestic and 
international prices, the final ECM model specification is proposed which allows to ascertain the 
results of the market liberalization prior to and after the reforms took place. To examine whether 
the co-integrating equation influences both variables;  𝑃𝑡
𝑑and 𝑃𝑡
𝑖, tests for weak exogeneity  are 
carried out, by employing the  likelihood ratio (LR) test.  The LR test is used to compare the fit 
of two models [(3a) vs. (3b) and  (4a) vs. (4b)], one of which (the null model) is a special case of 
the other (the alternative model). Whether the null model or the alternative fits significantly 
better, and should thus be preferred, is determined by deriving a probability or p-value. 
 
 
∆𝑃𝑡
𝑑 = 𝑎0 + 𝗼1𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝗼2∆𝑃𝑡−1
𝑑 + 𝗼3∆𝑃𝑡
𝑖 + 𝗼4∆𝑃𝑡−1
𝑖 + 𝗼5∆𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑡 + 𝗼6∆𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑡−1 +
                                                                                                                                            𝜀𝑡                         (3a) 
 
∆𝑃𝑡
𝑑 = 𝑎0 + 𝗼1∆𝑃𝑡−1
𝑑 + 𝗼2∆𝑃𝑡
𝑖 + 𝗼3𝑃𝑡−1
𝑖 + 𝗼4∆𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑡 + 𝗼5∆𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡                         (3b) 
 
 
∆𝑃𝑡
𝑖 = 𝑎0 + 𝗼1𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝗼2∆𝑃𝑡−1
𝑖 + 𝗼3∆𝑃𝑡
𝑑 + 𝗼4∆𝑃𝑡−1
𝑑 + 𝗼5∆𝑅𝐴𝐼𝑁𝑡 + 𝗼6∆𝑅𝐴𝐼𝑁𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡   (4a) 
 
∆𝑃𝑡
𝑖 = 𝑎0 + 𝗼1∆𝑃𝑡−1
𝑖 + 𝗼2∆𝑃𝑡
𝑑 + 𝗼3∆𝑃𝑡−1
𝑑 + 𝗼4∆𝑅𝐴𝐼𝑁𝑡 + ∆𝑅𝐴𝐼𝑁𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡                               (4b)  
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III.Data 
Monthly data on international coffee prices and prices  paid to growers in Colombia, Côte 
d’Ivoire  during the period January-1980 to December-2009, and Ghana during the period 
January-1980 to December-2006 is employed. I compile national domestic prices of coffee (farm 
gate level) and international prices of coffee; both received from the International Coffee 
Organization (ICO). Two international coffee prices are used; one for Robusta and one for 
Arabica. Colombia exports Arabica coffee beans while Ghana and Ivory Coast produce and 
export Robusta coffee beans. Arabica and Robusta prices are different and Robusta prices are, on 
average, lower than Arabica prices (Figure 2). It was thus important to use two different prices to 
accurately account for domestic coffee prices in Colombia (Arabica) and Ghana and Ivory Coast 
(Robusta). The Arabica price is calculated based on the weighted market share of exports of each 
group of coffee. Prices paid to growers represent the average price paid to the grower at farm-
gate level.  
 
[Figure 2 here] 
 
Monthly Normalized Difference Vegetation Index
4 in Colombia, Côte d’Ivoire, and Ghana is 
used to identify the short run dynamics of the domestic price equation because weather patterns 
affect  domestic  prices (Ackerman 2006). Satellite-derived Normalized Difference Vegetation 
                                                 
4 The Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI) provides a measure of the amount and vigor of vegetation at 
the land surface. The magnitude of NDVI is related to the level of photosynthetic activity in the observed vegetation. 
In general, higher values of NDVI indicate greater vigor and amounts of vegetation. NDVI is derived from data 
collected by National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) satellites, and processed by the Global 
Inventory Monitoring and Modeling Studies group (GIMMS) at the National Aeronautical and Space Administration 
(NASA). For a detailed discussion on NNDVI please refer to product documentation 
(http://earlywarning.usgs.gov/fews/africa/web/readme.php?symbol=nd) and references 26,28,30,35 and 36 listed at 
the end of this paper. Copies of these papers are made available by authors upon request.   
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Index (NDVI) has previously been used as a proxy for precipitation to detect and control for 
variation in local agriculture
5 (Brown et al. 2009). NDVI data have been used extensively in the 
Sahel to detect variations in vegetation production, and have been shown by a number of authors 
to be correlated to both NPP, crop yields (Tucker, 1985; Prince, 1991; Fuller, 1998), and 
precipitation (Nicholson 1993). The identifying restriction on the international price equations  
(4, 4a and 4b) is the monthly average precipitation in Fortaleza, Brazil. Brazil is the largest 
producer of coffee in the world (ICO 2011) and thus changes in the production and stock levels 
of coffee beans in Brazil may affect world prices. Descriptive statistics of the data are provided 
in Table 1. The mean domestic price in Ivory Coast and Ghana are almost identical, at 41 and 42 
cents per pound, respectively, and almost half of the mean International Robusta price which is 
83 cents per pound. Robusta prices have historically been lower than Arabica prices and the 
same is reflected in the data. The mean domestic price for Colombia is 83 cents per pound and 
the international Arabica price is 101 cents per pound. 
 
 
[Table 1 here] 
                                                 
5 For a unique application of NDVI to price forecasting please refer to Brown  et al. 2009  
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Chapter 3 
 
I. Modeling Non-stationary Economic Time Series 
 
A time series is a collection of observations measured sequentially over time. For a time series 
since the order or time sequence is critical, classical statistical procedures are not always 
appropriate, and thus different techniques have to be applied. Time series analysis techniques 
range from descriptive methods to inferential techniques. Inferential techniques range from 
stationarity test, co-integration analysis to various model specifications. In the following section, 
a brief overview of time series modeling approaches is presented. 
 
Analysis of Unit Root (Non-stationarity) 
 
For time series analysis, it is important to check whether a series is stationary or not before using 
it in modeling since the standard inference procedures can only be applied to stationary series. A 
stochastic time series Yt is said to be covariance stationary if, for all t and any s, it satisfies the 
following conditions  
 
𝐸(𝑦𝑡) = 𝐸(𝑦𝑡−𝑠) = 𝜇                        (1) 
 
𝐸[(𝑦𝑡 − 𝜇)(𝑦𝑡−𝑠 − 𝜇)] = 𝑟 𝑠                                                      (2) 
 
 
Where 𝑟 𝑠 is the sth lag autocovariance, and 𝜇 is the expected value of the time series, 𝑦𝑡. A data 
series is difference-stationary if it is not covariance stationary in levels, but its first difference is 
covariance stationary. A difference stationary series is also called a unit root or I(1) process. 
More generally, a difference stationary series can be denoted as I(d) where d is the order of  
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integration, which is the number of differencing operations it takes to make the series stationary. 
Unit root test is the formal method for testing for the stationarity of a time series. A 
simple AR(1) model is as follows;  
 
𝑦𝑡 =  𝜌𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑡                  (5) 
 
where yt is the variable of interest, t is the time index, ρ is a coefficient, and ut is the error term. 
A unit root is present if ρ = 1, in which case the model would be non-stationary. There are a 
variety of unit root tests, and the most popular is the Dickey-Fuller (DF) test. The equation for 
DF unit root test is given as DF test is specified as follows; 
 
∆𝑦𝑡 = (𝜌 − 1)𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑡 = 𝗿𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑡            (5a) 
 
 
where ∆ is the first difference operator. This model can be estimated and testing for a unit root 
is equivalent to testing 𝗿 = 0 (where 𝗿  = 𝜌  − 1). Since the test is done over the residual term 
rather than on the raw data, it is not possible to use on the standard t-distribution to provide 
critical values. Therefore this τ  statistic has a specific distribution simply known as the Dickey–
Fuller Table. 
 
 
There are three main versions of the test: 
 
Test for a unit root: 
∆𝑦𝑡 = 𝗿𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑡                  (5b) 
 
 
Test for a unit root with drift: 
∆𝑦𝑡 = 𝗼0 + 𝗿𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑡                (5c) 
 
 
Test for a unit root with drift and deterministic time trend: 
∆𝑦𝑡 = 𝗼0 + 𝗼1𝑡 + 𝗿𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑡              (5d)  
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Each version of the test has its own critical value which also depends on the size of the sample. 
In each case, the null hypothesis is that there is a unit root or that 𝗿  = 0. An extension to the DF 
test is the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test which constructs a parametric correction for 
higher-order serial correlation by assuming that the time series follows an AR(p) process and 
adding p lagged difference terms of the dependent variable to the right-hand side of the test 
regression (Gujarati 2003). Since in practice, most time series tend to contain higher order lags, 
ADF test is more popularly used than DF test. The testing procedure for the ADF test is the same 
as for the Dickey–Fuller test but it is applied to the model 
 
∆𝑦𝑡 = 𝗽1 + 𝗽2𝑡 + 𝗾𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝗿 ∑ ∆𝑦𝑡−𝑖
𝑚
𝑖=1 + 𝜀𝑡          (6) 
 
where α is a constant, β the coefficient on a time trend and p the lag order of the autoregressive 
process.  By including lags of the order ρ , the ADF formulation allows for higher-order 
autoregressive processes. This means that the lag length ρ has to be determined when applying 
the test. The unit root test is then carried out under the null hypothesis γ  =  0 against the 
alternative hypothesis of γ < 0. Once a value for the test statistic is computed it can be compared 
to the relevant critical value for the Dickey–Fuller Test. If the test statistic is less than (a larger 
negative) the critical value, then the null hypothesis of γ  = 0 is rejected and no unit root is 
present. 
 
I construct ADF tests with non-stationarity under the null hypothesis. Test results are exhibited 
in Table 2. The results suggest that all domestic price series as well as the international price 
series contain unit roots with and without a constant term. Comparing the τ  statistic obtained 
from the unit root tests with the critical values from the DF Table [-2.88 (with constant) and –  
35 
1.95 (no constant)], I fail to reject the null that γ = 0 (non-stationary). Thus,  in levels, a unit root 
is present for each time series. Once differenced the results were different. Since the absolute 
values of all τ statistics were greater than the critical values from the DF Table, I reject the null 
that γ = 0, thus concluding that no unit root remains in the time series transformed in first 
differences. 
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
Co-integration Analysis 
 
Typically, most economic time series are I(1)  process which requires us to take the first 
difference for the series to make it stationary. The presence of a co-integration relationship forms 
the basis for the error correction model specification. Therefore, with an I(1) time series, prior to 
further empirical analysis, it is important to test for co-integration. All I(1) time series are said to 
be co-integrated if there exists a linear combination of the variables being stationary. Different 
tests for co-integration are used to determine whether a group of I(1) series are co-integrated or 
not. Engle and Granger (1987) proposed a procedure for testing the existence of a co-integrating 
vector. The following simple co-integration equation is used to examine the co-integration 
relationship between any two variables, Y t and X. An I(1) time series are said to be cointegrated 
if there exists a linear combination of the (stationary) variables being stationary. A cointegration 
relationship can be interpreted as long run equilibrium.   
 
 
𝑌 𝑡 = 𝗼0 + 𝗼1𝑋𝑡 + 𝜏𝑡                 (7) 
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The results from the co-integrating tests are presented  in Ttable 3. The unit root test reveal that 
the residuals from each co-integrating relationship are stationary for  Ghana and the Ivory  Coast 
but not for Colombia and thus validate the use of an ECM for the models for Ghana and the 
Ivory Coast but not for Colombia.  
 
[Table 3 here] 
 
  
However,  one  limitation of this approach is that it can only be used to estimate one co-
integrating relation at a time. The Johansen VAR-based maximum likelihood (ML) co-
integration test, which was developed based on the methodology proposed by Johansen (1988) 
and Johansen and Juselius (1990) allows for multiple co-integrating vectors to be tested at a time. 
Johansen’s multivariate co-integration model is based on the error correction representation 
given by  
 
∆𝑋𝑡 = 𝜇 + ∑ Ƭ𝑖∆𝑋𝑡−1 + ∏𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑡
𝑝−𝑖
𝑖=1             (8) 
 
 
where Xt is an (n x 1) column vector of p variables, µ is an (n x 1) vector of constant terms, Ƭ and 
∏ represent coefficient matrices, k denotes the lag length, and 𝑒𝑡 is a white noise disturbance 
term. The co-integrating rank can be tested with two statistics: the trace test and the maximal 
eigenvalue test. These two test statistics for co-integration are formulated  
 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒 = −𝑇∑ ln  (1 − 𝜆𝑖) 𝑛
𝑖=𝑟+1                (9) 
 
𝜆𝑚𝑎𝑥  = −𝑇𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝜆𝑟)                (10) 
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Trace tests the null that the number of co-integrating vectors is less than or equal to r (the 
number of co-integrating ranks) against an unspecified alternative. λTrace = 0 when all the 𝜆𝑖= 0, 
so it is a joint test. λmax tests the null that the number of co-integrating vectors is r against an 
alternative of r+1. If the co-integration test indicates that co-integration exists, then the 
appropriate model specification is an error correction model (Awokuse, 2003). I  test  co-
integration using both, the Engle and Granger method and the Johansen approach. Critical values 
for this test are reported in (Osterwald-Lenum 1992). For each country I conducted λmax as well 
as  λtrace  tests  for  domestic  price  with  respect  to  the  international price. These results are 
reported in Tables 4.1-4.3, where r is the number of co-integrating vectors.  
 
[Tables 4.1-4.3 here]  
 
Since the test generated values exceed the critical values for the λmax and λtrace, it is possible to 
reject the null hypothesis of no co- integrating vectors and thus conclude that each country has at 
least 1 co-integrating vector with the international price series. I am  thus satisfied that the ECM 
representation is a valid one to express the relationship between the international price and the 
domestic price series for each country.  
 
Weak Exogeneity 
 
To define weak exogeneity, first note that a joint distribution of the variables in yt
`  and  xt
`  
conditional on past values of x`and y`can be expressed as the product of the joint distribution of 
yt
` conditional on xt
`  and past values of xt
`   and yt
`  and the joint distribution of xt
` conditional on 
past values of xt
` and yt
`. The intuition behind the concept of weak exogeneity is that yt
` has no  
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“feedback” into the current (marginal) distribution of xt
`  over and above what past values of y` 
and x` have. Weak exogeneity is less restrictive than strict exogeneity as the researcher  can use 
past values of y as regressors and is only relevant for models that have some kind of time series 
element to them. Weak exogeneity requires that there is no loss of information about the 
parameters of interest in reducing the analysis from the joint distribution to a conditional model 
(Banerjee et al). For my analysis weak exogeniety is important because if Pt
i is weak-exogenous, 
then I can estimate a single equation as the final model instead a series of equations.  
 
For the test for weak exogeneity  I estimate the equations (3a) vs (3b) and (4a) vs (4b)  using the 
likelihood ratio (LR) test.  The short run dynamics are captured by dummy variables and 
variables for weather.  
 
∆𝑃𝑡
𝑑 = 𝑎0 + 𝗼1𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝗼2∆𝑃𝑡−1
𝑑 + 𝗼3∆𝑃𝑡
𝑖 + 𝗼4∆𝑃𝑡−1
𝑖 + 𝗼5∆𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑡 + 𝗼6∆𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑡−1 +
𝜀𝑡                                                                                                                                                                      (3a) 
 
∆𝑃𝑡
𝑑 = 𝑎0 + 𝗼1∆𝑃𝑡−1
𝑑 + 𝗼2∆𝑃𝑡
𝑖 + 𝗼3𝑃𝑡−1
𝑖 + 𝗼4∆𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑡 + 𝗼5∆𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡                         (3b) 
 
 
∆𝑃𝑡
𝑖 = 𝑎0 + 𝗼1𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝗼2∆𝑃𝑡−1
𝑖 + 𝗼3∆𝑃𝑡
𝑑 + 𝗼4∆𝑃𝑡−1
𝑑 + 𝗼5∆𝑅𝐴𝐼𝑁𝑡 + 𝗼6∆𝑅𝐴𝐼𝑁𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡   (4a) 
 
∆𝑃𝑡
𝑖 = 𝑎0 + 𝗼1∆𝑃𝑡−1
𝑖 + 𝗼2∆𝑃𝑡
𝑑 + 𝗼3∆𝑃𝑡−1
𝑑 + 𝗼4∆𝑅𝐴𝐼𝑁𝑡 + ∆𝑅𝐴𝐼𝑁𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡                               (4b) 
 
 
The statistical method employed to test for weak exogeneity is the likelihood ratio (LR) test.  
The LR test is used to compare the fit of two models, one of which (the null model) is a special 
case of the other (the alternative model) or in other words is nested in the second model. The test 
is based on the likelihood ratio, which expresses how many times more likely the data are under  
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one model than the other. This likelihood ratio, or equivalently its logarithm, can then be used to 
compute a p-value, or compared to a critical value to decide whether to reject the null model in 
favor  of the alternative model. Both models are fitted to the data and their log-likelihood 
recorded. The test statistic (usually denoted D) is twice the difference in these log-likelihoods 
 
𝐷 = −2[ln  (𝐿𝑖𝑘𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑛𝑢𝑙𝑙 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙) − (𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙)] 
= −2𝑙𝑛 �
ln  (𝐿𝑖𝑘𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑛𝑢𝑙𝑙 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙
𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙�       (11) 
 
The model with more parameters will always fit at least as well (have a greater log-likelihood). 
Whether it fits significantly better and should thus be preferred can be determined by deriving 
the probability or p-value of the obtained difference D.  
 
Test results exhibited in Table 5 indicate that the international price is weak exogenous in the 
bivariate model for in all three countries. Weak exogeneity in the international price implies that 
deviations from the equilibrium cause price adjustments in domestic prices only. Furthermore, 
given that each country, Pt
i is weak-exogenous, a single equation can be estimated.  
 
[Table 5 here] 
 
 
II. Final Model 
 
There is more than one strategy to estimate the ECM. Engle and Granger (1987) suggest a two-
stage method in which estimation of a simple but asymptotically efficient two-stage  estimator is 
proposed. As suggested by Gómez, Lee and Körner (2010), the 2 two-stage method is better  
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suited to large samples and if the long-run relationship shows asymmetries in the error correction 
term. An alternative, especially if one is dealing with smaller samples, is to use a one-stage 
model in which the components of the error correction term are employed directly in the 
estimating equation. That is the approach followed here. Having tested for stationarity, satisfying 
the condition of a co-integrating relationship and of weak exogeneity andbased on tests presented 
in Table 5, I modify equations (3a) and (4a) and estimate the following model for each country.  
 
∆𝑃𝑡
𝑑 = 𝑎0 + 𝗼1𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝗼2∆𝑃𝑡−1
𝑑 + 𝗼3∆𝑃𝑡
𝑖 + 𝗼4∆𝑃𝑡−1
𝑖 + 𝗼5∆𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑡 + 𝗼6∆𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑡−1 + 𝗼7𝐷𝑡
+ 𝗼8𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷𝑡 + 𝗼9𝐷𝑡 ∗ ∆𝑃𝑡
𝑖 + 𝜀𝑡                             (12)  
 
 
Where  ∆ represents change  and  ∆𝑃𝑡
𝑑  is equal to change in domestic prices paid to 
producer,𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑡−1 is equal to Lag of the Error Correction Term,∆𝑃𝑡
𝑖 is equal to  the change in 
International Prices, ∆Pt−1
d  is equal to the lag of change in domestic prices, ∆Pt−1
i is equal to the 
 lag of change in International Prices,  ∆Precipt= change in precipitation within the country, 
∆Precipt−1 =  lag in change in precipitation within the country, Dt 
is the dummy variable for reform ,  ECTt−1 ∗ Dt is  an interaction term and accounts for the 
interaction between the Error Correction term with the dummy variable, Dt ∗ ∆Pt
i  is  an 
interaction term and accounts for the interaction between the International price term with the 
dummy variable, εt is the error term. 
 
Assuming that E(𝜀𝑖) = 0  I  can obtain the differential slope coefficients for the different 
parameters 𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑡−1,∆𝑃𝑡
𝑖,∆𝑃𝑡−1
𝑑 , ∆𝑃𝑡−1
𝑖 .  
𝜕∆𝑃𝑡
𝑑
𝜕𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑡−1
 = 𝗼1 + 𝗼8 ∗ 𝐷𝑡                (11a) 
  
41 
From 11 one can see that the period prior to reform, 𝐷𝑡 = 0  and   
𝜕∆𝑃𝑡
𝑑
𝜕𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑡−1
 =𝗼1, while in the 
period after the reform  𝐷𝑡 = 1 and 
𝜕∆𝑃𝑡
𝑑
𝜕𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑡−1
 =  𝗼1 + 𝗼8. The same can be done for the other 
parameters in equation 11. α8 is the differential slope coefficient indicating by how much the 
slope coefficient of the second period (after reforms which receives the dummy variable of 1) 
differs from the first period (before reforms which receives the dummy value of 0).  
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Chapter 4 
 
I. Results  
The estimates of producer prices, pre and post-liberalization, as a share of world prices are 
presented in Figure 1, together with the results of the error-correction model in Tables 6.1, 6.2 
and 6.3. The general conclusion from Figure 1 is that reforms did not result in producer price 
shares increases in Ghana and the Ivory Coast, but did result in greater integration of domestic 
and world prices in Colombia. The same is exhibited in Figures 3, 5 and 7. The individual time 
series’ show that in Colombia prices moved closer together and towards what may be identified 
as a long term equilibrium. In Ghana and the Ivory Coast the prices series exhibit a divergence. 
However, a deeper analysis is required for a complete picture. 
 
[Table 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 here] 
 
[Figure 1 here]  
 
While discussing the estimation results for each of the countries the focus will remain on the 
speed of adjustment and the change in domestic prices caused by the aggregate effect of change 
in international prices. The speed of adjustment is measured before and after reforms; before by 
(𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑡−1) and after by  (𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷𝑡) and the changes in domestic prices caused by the aggregate 
effect of change in international prices are measured by ∆𝑃𝑡
𝑖 and 𝐷𝑡 ∗ ∆𝑃𝑡
𝑖. 
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Colombia 
 
Colombia is a great example of how a board that works for the benefit of the producers sets 
prices that reflect more closely the changes in international prices (Figure 3). From 1980 to 1990 
domestic prices were below the international price after which domestic prices were in some 
cases 120% (Figure 4) of the international price. In 1995 the artificially high prices were reduced 
to lowest levels on the back of falling international prices (Figure 3) and in some cases were as 
low as 40% (Figure 4) of international price levels. What is interesting is that while domestic 
prices followed suit with international prices and continuously fell from 1997 to 2003, domestic 
prices as a percentage of international prices actually increased from 1995 to 2003 (Figure 4). 
 
[Figure 3 here] 
 
[Figure 4 here] 
 
The domestic price equation for Colombia explains 53 percent of the variation in international 
prices  (Table 6.1). In other words the independent variables in the domestic price equation 
explain 53% of the variance in the change in domestic prices of coffee in Colombia.  The F-test, 
which determines whether the proposed relationship between the change in domestic price and 
the set of predictors in the domestic price equation is statistically reliable, is 32.07 of a 1 percent 
level of significance. This indicates that the overall reliability of the model is strong. 
 
In Colombia, the speed of adjustment before market liberalization (1980-1995) was 8% per 
month, however results indicate that after reforms (1995 to 2009), there is no change in the speed 
of adjustment in response to a change in international prices. This result suggests that the speed 
at which changes in international prices were being passed on through domestic prices to farmers 
was not different in  both, pre  and post structural adjustment periods.    The regression also  
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provides information on the responsiveness of domestic prices to international prices (current 
and lagged) before and after reforms. Before reforms, the net increase in domestic prices 10.1 
cents for a 1 dollar increase in international prices while after reforms the net increase in 
domestic prices is 94 cents for a 1 dollar increase in in international prices. By disentangling the 
aggregate  effect  of international prices changes into instantaneous (current price) and prior 
period (lagged) affects one can determine the individual effect of each period. While the effect of 
changes in current international prices on domestic prices is not statistically different from 0 
before reforms, the instantaneous effect of a 1 dollar change in current international prices after 
reforms causes domestic prices to increase by 70 cents. Prior period or lagged international 
prices cause domestic prices to rise by 10 cents for every dollar increase before reforms and 35 
cents for every dollar increase after reforms. Though international prices in both periods impact 
domestic prices, it is evident that the current period international prices have a more significant 
affect than prior period international prices. The Colombian price setting system in other words 
treats current international prices are more important than prior periods, reflecting degree of 
price transmission. Prior to reforms current domestic prices increase about 27 cents for every 1 
dollar increase in prior period domestic prices but fall 14 cents for every 1 dollar increase in 
prior period domestic prices after market liberalization. Precipitation, both current and past, has 
no effect on the domestic price of coffee in Colombia. The numbers suggest that while farmers 
received a higher share of changing international prices, a clear indication of greater integration 
with international markets, the speed of transmission indicates that the farmers were receiving 
these prices increases did not improve.   
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Ghana 
 
Producers in Ghana have not had the same fortune as those in Colombia. From Figure 5 it is 
clear that domestic prices of coffee beans have consistently been lower than the Robusta 
international price from 1983 onwards. Agricultural policy in 1983 was fundamental to the 
dissolution of the Ghanaian economy. The overvaluation of the cedi (Brooks 2007) implied that 
the domestic currency equivalent of the free on board (f.o.b.) price of coffee would fall fast. 
Export earnings fell to a low of 7 percent of GDP, and external financing dried up (Brooks 
2007).Domestic prices were higher than international prices from 1981 to 1983 (Figure 5) but 
then consistently fell till 1992, incidentally, when market reforms took place. Prices rose then till 
1995 before falling again. In 1992 and 1995 domestic prices were 80% and 100%, respectively, 
of international prices (Figure 6). From 2000 onwards domestic prices, both in absolute terms 
and as a percentage of international prices have fallen consistently.  
 
[Figure 5 here] 
 
[Figure 6 here] 
 
 
The independent variables in the domestic price equation explain about 11 % of the variance in 
the change in domestic prices of coffee in Ghana. The F-value, is 3.11 with a probability of 
0.0006, indicates a strong overall reliability of the model. A fewer number of observations are 
used in the regression analysis than in the analysis for Colombia and the Ivory Coast, because 
coffee data from Ghana was available only from for 2006 onwards. 
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In Ghana, the speed of adjustment after reforms (1995 to 2006) has not changed when compared 
to the period before market liberalization (1980-1992). This result suggests that the speed at  
which changes in international prices were being passed on through domestic prices to farmers 
was the same as in the period before reforms. These results are consistent with Krivonos (2004). 
The regression also provides information on the responsiveness of domestic prices to 
international prices before and after reforms. The numbers suggest that, in a given month, before 
reforms the net decrease in domestic prices is 6 cents for a 1 dollar increase in international 
prices while after reforms there is a net increase of 5 cents in domestic prices for a 1 dollar 
increase in in international prices. However, given that all but one international price variable are 
not statistically different from zero, I conclude that the there is no net change in domestic prices 
caused by changes in international prices in both, pre and post, reform periods. By disentangling 
the aggregate effect of international price changes into instantaneous (current effect) and prior 
period (lagged effect) affects one can determine the individual effect of each period. Results 
exhibit that the instantaneous effect of changes in current international prices to domestic prices 
is not statistically different from 0 prior to reforms. Similarly, changes in international prices 
cause no instantaneous change in domestic prices after reforms as well (the coefficient is not 
statistically different from 0). While a  dollar change in the  prior period international prices 
causes no change in domestic prices before reforms, after reforms an increase of every dollar in 
prior period international prices causes current domestic prices to increase  by 13 cents.   In 
Ghana, while a dollar change in prior period domestic prices cause domestic prices to rise 0.10 
cents before reforms, it causes current domestic prices to fall by 31cents. The numbers suggest 
that farmers are slightly better off in terms of share of international prices passed on to them, but 
no better or worse off in terms of the speed at which these price changes are passed on them. The  
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results of the reforms, while not as pronounced as those in Colombia, were also not as intended 
by policy makers.  Precipitation, both current and past, has no affect on the domestic price of 
coffee in Ghana. 
 
 
Ivory Coast 
 
Producers in the Ivory Coast seem to be the worst off in terms of domestic prices as a percentage 
of international  prices. Domestic prices have consistently been significantly lower than 
international prices (Figure 7) except in briefly in 2000, where domestic prices were nearly 200 
percent of international prices (Figure 8).  In 1999 global supply of coffee rose leading to a fall 
in the global prices (Gilbert at.al.2004), which may explain why in 2000 domestic prices were 
higher. However, immediately after that prices fell sharply and since then, domestic prices as a 
percentage of international prices have been hovering around the 50% mark, spiking only 
occasionally (Figure 8). 
 
The independent variables in the domestic price equation explain 8 % of the variance in the 
change in domestic prices of coffee in The Ivory Coast. The F-value, is 2.47 with a probability of 
0.006, indicates a weak overall reliability of the model. Based on the overall weak fit of the 
model one cannot determine conclusively both the magnitude as well as the direction of partial 
change of the variables. 
 
II. Cross country comparison 
The findings in this paper exhibit that farmers received a higher share of changing international 
prices in Colombia, while  in Ghana farmers are no better or worse off in terms of the share of  
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international prices passed on to them. The results thus indicate that with private enterprises 
simply taking the place of government run marketing boards liberalization does not necessarily 
ensure higher prices  for producers.  While reforms led to more integration in Colombia, the 
opening up of the Ghanian market is thus inconsistent with what the policy target was. However, 
in terms of the speed of adjustment, farmers from Ghana no better off than the farmers from 
Colombia. While Ghanaian coffee producers were no worse off in terms of the speed at which 
price change was passed on to them after reforms, the speed of adjustment of domestic prices to 
international prices was slower for Colombian farmers.  
 
Prior period domestic prices in both Ghana and Colombia play a more positive role in the price 
setting mechanism before reforms than after. In both Colombia and Ghana, before reforms 
current domestic prices increase for every 1 dollar increase in prior period domestic prices but 
fall for every 1 dollar increase in prior period domestic prices after market liberalization. 
Precipitation has no impact on domestic prices in both Colombia and Ghana.  
 
 
III. Concluding remarks 
 
 
Using an error-correction model (ECM), this study examines price transmission from the world 
coffee market to local markets. The results show that the share of producer price in the world 
price has increased substantially for Colombia since reforms were introduced, but not for  Ghana 
and the Ivory Coast. There may be several reasons for the lack of results in Ghana. The impact of 
the liberalization process could have been limited due to lack of an adequate market information 
system, poor access to credit and high marketing costs. In general, dismantling market parastatals  
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may be necessary but not sufficient conditions for efficient private markets to evolve. In the 
absence of appropriate infrastructure, institutions and legal reforms, spatially distributed markets 
may continue to lack integration. The extent of liberalization and the type of infrastructure in 
place prior to liberalization was different in Colombia and Ghana  and this may explain the 
variation in the results. The producer friendly approach adopted in Colombia prior to reforms 
drastically contrasts with the set up found in both Ghana and Ivory Coast, where government 
agencies controlled the operation of the coffee marketing chains. In Colombia integration of 
domestic prices with international prices was already high and reforms only served to reinforce 
the status quo. In the West African countries,  while the aim was to correct the existing 
institutional failures, it seems reforms have failed and that the status quo remained. 
 
 It should be noted that I have simply looked at prices in this analysis. Taking into account the 
increased costs and changing margins (Amsalu et.al. 2010, Ponte 2002) after reforms one may 
arrive at another result, i.e. farmers were either worse off or better after reforms. There are other 
factors (Commodity substitution at the farm level, inventory levels and smuggling) that may play 
into the analysis of domestic prices, but are beyond the scope of this paper and thus not part of 
the analysis. 
 
Based on the findings of this thesis, it is reasonable to conclude that a one size-fits-all strategy 
does not work in policy making. Policy makers have the obligation to assess the difference in 
culture, existing marketing board set-ups and the impact of blanket policies within different 
states before implementation of adjustment programs. Policymakers, thus face the onerous task  
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of studying each economy in detail in order to be mindful of the effects of its policies on, not 
only the sector at hand but even on others that either feed into or rely on the coffee sector.  
 
My thesis reveals important insights into the structural adjustments and their impact on the 
coffee producers in Colombia and Ghana, but several limitations indicate the need for future 
research, especially where Ivory Coast is concerned. Obtaining accurate month-end inventory 
data will be key to assessing the impact of inventory levels current on domestic prices. Going a 
step further there is opportunity to study the asymmetries in the price transmission mechanism in 
the countries analyzed.  
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 1 : Descriptive statistics of the estimating sample, 1980-2009 
Descriptive Statistics 
   min  max  Stdev  Mean 
Domestic Price-Ivory Coast  12  78  14  41 
Precipitation-Ivory Coast  -3180  21830  2277  5117 
Domestic price-Ghana  8  137  33  42 
Precipitation-Ghana  1484  6709  1212  4723 
International Robusta Price  21  183  37  83 
Domestic Price- Colombia  45  172  23  81 
Precipitation-Colombia  4021  7006  534  5634 
International Arabica Price  41  204  37  101 
Rain  0.00  8.31  1.53  1.35 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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Table 2 : ADF test on Pooled Data 
Variables in Levels    
Critical Value 
* 
International 
Price  Columbia  Ghana 
Ivory 
Coast 
ADF-t  Ho :  ~ I (1)  -2.88  -2.55  -1.79  -2.52  -2.14 
 
Ho :  ~ I (1) -
No Constant  -1.95  -1.08  0.053  -1.09  -1.47 
Variables in 
Differences    
Critical Value 
* 
International 
Price  Columbia  Ghana 
Ivory 
Coast 
ADF-t  Ho :  ~ I (1)  -2.88  -15.04  -17.34  -18.46  -17.24 
  
Ho :  ~ I (1) -
No Constant  -1.95  -15.06  -17.35  -18.48  -17.24 
* at 95% significance 
           
Source: Author’s calculations 
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Table 3: Co-integration  test on residuals[pooled] 
Variables in 
Levels    
Critical 
Value 
*  Columbia  Ghana 
Ivory 
Coast 
ADF-t  Ho :  ~ I (1)  -2.88  -2.072  -3.014  -4.693 
  
Ho :  ~ I (1) -No 
Constant  -1.95  -2.080  -3.019  -4.687 
* at 95% significance 
 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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Table 4.1 -4.3: Test for Co-integration-[pooled] (Johansen Test),1  lag     
 
Table 4.1 –Ivory Coast 
The λmax and λtrace Tests (1 lag) 
H0  H1  Statistic 
5 % Critical 
Value 
1 % 
Critical 
 λtrace Tests     λtrace Value    
r =0  
r > 
0  154.6689  94.15  103.18 
r ≤ 1  r >1  76.2658  68.52  76.07 
 λmax Tests      λmax Value    
r =0   r=1  78.4031  39.37  45.1 
r =1  r =2  39.5856  33.46  38.77 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
 
Table 4.2-Ghana 
The λmax and λtrace Tests (1 lag) 
H0  H1  Statistic 
5 % Critical 
Value 
1 % 
Critical 
Value 
 λtrace Tests     λtrace Value    
r =0  
r > 
0  170.7262  94.15  103.18 
r ≤ 1  r >1  79.4683  68.52  76.07 
 λmax Tests      λmax Value    
r =0   r=1  91.2579  39.37  45.1 
r =1  r =2  41.8844  33.46  38.77 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
Table 4.3-Colombia 
The λmax and λtrace Tests (1 lag) 
H0  H1  Statistic 
5 % Critical 
Value 
1 % 
Critical 
 λtrace Tests     λtrace Value    
r =0  
r > 
0  165.8981  94.15  103.18 
r ≤ 1  r >1  90.3606  68.52  76.07 
 λmax Tests      λmax Value    
r =0   r=1  75.5375  39.37  45.1 
r =1  r =2  37.4465  33.46  38.77 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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Table 5 : Test for Weak Exogeneity -[pooled] 
Test for Weak Exongeneity-Consolidated 
Weak Exogeneity Test H0 
:co-integrating vector has 
no influence on 
endogenous variable) 
χ2 (1) Critical 
Value at 5 %  Colombia  Ghana 
Ivory 
Coast 
Domestic price as 
endogenous variable  3.84  11.79  7.78  14.65 
  Prob > chi2  0.0006  0.0053  0.000 
International price as 
endogenous variable  3.84  0.37  1.01  1.92 
   Prob > chi2  0.5436  0.314  0.1659 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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Table 6.1 : Estimation results  
Colombia 
   ECM -1 Lag 
   b   se   
Constant     -0.82  (0.52) 
ECTt-1  -0.078*    (0.03) 
D*ECTt-1        0.02  (0.04) 
ΔArabica_itl_pricet  0.001  (0.04) 
D*ΔArabica_itl_pricet  0.691***  (0.06) 
Δdomestic_pricet-1  0.270**   (0.01) 
D*Δdomestic_pricet-1  -0.405***  (0.12) 
ΔArabica_itl_pricet-1  0.100**   (0.04) 
D*ΔArabica_itl_pricet-1  0.244**   (0.07) 
Dummy for reforms (D)            1.591*    (0.64) 
Δprecipitation        0.001  (0.00) 
Δprecipitationt-1        -0.001  (0.00) 
No.Of observations  328.00   - 
R
2  0.5275  - 
Adj R
2  0.5111  - 
F( 11,   316)   32.07  - 
Prob > F    0.000  - 
a Standard errors in parenthesis; *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level,  
* significant at 10% level. 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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Table 6.2 : Estimation results  
Ghana 
   ECM -1 Lag 
   b     se 
Constant     0.108  (0.85) 
ECTt-1  -0.039  (0.02) 
D*ECTt-1        -0.088  (0.04) 
ΔRobusta_itl_pricet  0.177  (0.13) 
D*ΔRobusta_itl_pricet  -0.315  (0.17) 
Δdomestic_pricet-1  0.095  (0.07) 
D*Δdomestic_pricet-1  -0.405***  (0.12) 
ΔRobusta_itl_pricet-1  -0.234  (0.04) 
D*ΔRobusta_itl_pricet-1   0.362*    (0.07) 
Δprecipitation        0.001  (0.00) 
Δprecipitationt-1        0.000  (0.00) 
Dummy for reforms (D)            -0.869  (1.14) 
No.Of observations  291.00   - 
R
2  0.1091  - 
Adj R
2  0.0739  - 
F( 11,   279)   3.11  - 
Prob > F    0.001  - 
a Standard errors in parenthesis; *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level,  
* significant at 10% level. 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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Table 6.3 : Estimation results  
Ivory Coast  
   ECM -1 Lag 
   b     se 
Constant     -0.236  (0.34) 
ECTt-1  -0.05  (0.03) 
D*ECTt-1        -0.037  (0.04) 
ΔRobusta_itl_pricet  0.033  (0.04) 
D*ΔRobusta_itl_pricet  0.028  (0.06) 
Δdomestic_pricet-1  0.069  (0.12) 
D*Δdomestic_pricet-1  -0.068  (0.13) 
ΔRobusta_itl_pricet-1  -0.028  (0.04) 
D*ΔRobusta_itl_pricet-1  0.031  (0.06) 
Δprecipitation        0.004  (0.43) 
Δprecipitationt-1        0.000  (0.00) 
Dummy for reforms (D)            0.000  (0.00) 
No.Of observations  316.00   - 
R
2  0.082  - 
Adj R
2  0.0488  - 
F( 11,   316)   2.47  - 
Prob > F    0.006  - 
a Standard errors in parenthesis; *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level,  
* significant at 10% level. 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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Figure 1:Share of producer prices in international prices 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2:Price series – Robusta International prices and Arabica international prices 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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Figure 3:Price series – Colombia-domestic prices and international prices 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Domestic price as a percentage of International prices –Colombia  
Source: Author’s calculations 
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Figure 5:Price series – Ivory Coast-domestic prices and international prices 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Domestic price as a percentage of International prices –Ghana 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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Figure 7:Price series – Ghana-domestic prices and international prices 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Domestic price as a percentage of International prices –Ivory Coast 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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